In support of Department of Defense (DoD) and theater objectives, Combatant Commands (COCOMs) conduct Military-to-Military (M2M) training with partner countries in their area of responsibility. United States (US) European Command (EUCOM) had experienced a period of poor relations with Russia in the mid 2000's, but reinvigorated the M2M program following Presidents Medvedev and Obama's "reset" in relations. Three years after the reset, EUCOM has observed that the M2M execution rate remains low (averaging 44%) and has raised the question if the US is making progress in terms of achieving end-states or if the Command is just doing the same things repeatedly for the sake of engagement.
The disconnect between the plan and outcomes is rooted in two issues. First, EUCOM lacks a structured intellectual mechanism by which to predict Russian interests in cooperation (i.e. outcomes) and second, EUCOM over-emphasizes volume of engagement as the primary metric of M2M success. Rather, the solution to both of these issues is to build an outcome focused work plan based on a thorough and contemporary understanding of Russian values.
This research highlights three Russian cultural traits, as examples of the type of knowledge EUCOM planners need to possess in order to design meaningful work plans: 1) Understand the importance of prestige to Russian decision making, 2) recognize Russia does not perceive commitments to obligations in the same way as the US, and 3) appreciate that although Russians embrace closer ties with the West, they simultaneously fear a change to their distinct Russian identity and that they may be perceived as dependent on Western assistance. This paper advocates a four-step approach to improving EUCOM work plan efficacy.
1. Establish a robust staff process to develop Russo-savvy planners. 2. Readdress the development of the work plan, with an expectation-based approach towards engagement selection. 3. Track the outcomes of engagements (in order to make a quality assessment of each M2M activity) 4. "Advertise" M2M outcomes (as opposed to number of engagements)
Initially this approach to work plan development will require additional time and resources, as well as curtail the volume of engagements, especially as compared to contemporary rates. However, this research suggests the benefits of a cyclical application of the above four-step process will become self-reinforcing over time, and allow planners to select those venues that are both most likely to be executed and that maximize benefits to EUCOM. However, in line with their historic perspective, the Kremlin does so with low (compared to Western values) concern of actively participating in or abiding to those commitments.
Furthermore, when faced with unexpected costs or possible negative outcomes, Russia is comfortable with defaulting to internal interests and defecting from the same relationships they initially sought. 17 Thus, despite the ever-growing spectrum of issues which seem to bring Russia and the US into a closer relationship, "these common interests are insufficient in and of themselves to induce Russia to cooperate with the United States consistently and broadly." 18 Additionally, the very activities in which the US wants to engage Russia in order to build capacity or connectivity are often of such marginal capability that the expectation of cooperation may be misplaced. For example, the EU's attempt to include the Kremlin in conflict prevention and crisis management operations has been largely unsuccessful due to the limited physical and The declining M2M execution rate serves as an example of how understanding Russian values can be useful in a practical sense. The actual number of M2M events successfully executed for each of the last three years (see Figure 1 ) has increased moderately. However, once the increasing number of scheduled events in each years' work plan are taken into consideration, the overall execution rate is clearly trending downward. The declining execution rate in years 2010-2012 suggest a Russian equilibrium or even fatigue regarding the number of M2M activities they are able or interested in executing. Additionally, they may be optimizing limited resources by only participating in a tailored number of engagements. Alternatively, they may be hand-selecting only the most desirable M2M opportunities from the work plan, as there is no penalty for limited participation in the agreed upon schedule of events. An understanding of the Kremlin's focus on prestige or their tendency to marginalize participation in agreements can allow planners to manage US expectations and shift from counting the number of successful engagements towards selecting those engagements with the greatest value.
This leads into the second part of this examination, which addresses EUCOM's focus on quantifiable data. As referenced at the introduction, ECJ5's query, "what types of engagement work" is important in that it highlights that EUCOM recognizes a need to focus on engagement outcomes and not engagement volume. EUCOM has the right goal of trying to determine where the US is making progress in terms of achieving desired end states. However, if planners only pursue those events with expected benefit to US interests, or expand the number of M2M engagements for the sole purpose of improving partnering relationships, they are likely to find Russian commitment to participation will continue to mirror contemporary low success rates.
Indeed, European Command planners are not the only ones struggling with this issue.
The EU has one of the broadest relationships with Russia of any other organization or nation.
However, they have observed that on many topics their relationship with Russia tends not to be very productive; but the EU has ascribed to the belief that the myriad of ways in which they connect with Moscow are worth fostering for the sake of maintaining and improving the bilateral relationship. Yet an improved relationship has not emerged, instead the "institutional interaction may help sustain an illusion of activity" at the cost of real gains. 24 So at least from the European Union's perspective, the take-away from this observation is that "engagement for engagement's sake" is not working.
In light of the recommendation to focus on values, the following four-step process can serve to move EUCOM towards an outcome-based M2M work plan. First, maintain a command environment that focuses on a holistic approach to educating planners on cultural Russian cultural traits that shape policy. Some important mechanisms for developing a Russo-savvy staff include propagating the results of senior leader engagements (out briefs), formal academic education, professional development, personal research and providing regional specialists (desk officers, division chiefs, attachés) the time and resources in the workplace to pursue education and employ their skills. Numerous work place restrictions and distractions make that last item the most challenging to implement, but it is arguably the most critical. This paper has attempted to extract from contemporary research on Russia several unique features that can aid planners in the understanding of Moscow's stance, but it is also intended to demonstrate the type and depth of knowledge planners can accrue, given the proper workplace environment. This approach of affording staffs the opportunity to stay regularly immersed in news/academia/policy will over the long term significantly enhance their ability to understand and predict the peculiarities of Russian foreign policy decisions.
This observation is not intended to be pejorative of the quality of EUCOM's Black SeaEurasia planning section, but rather to emphasize the vital importance of knowledgeable planners. A proper education-focused planning environment is also necessary because of the mechanism through which planning staffs accrue personnel. Few people arrive at European
Command as regional or country experts. Upon an individual's assignment to a joint organization the various Directorates in the staff "draft" new personnel based on known or records-based assessments of their skill sets. Frequently this results in a newly assigned officer discovering that he or she is the deputy planner for a country in which he or she has no specific knowledge or experience, simply because their record indicated they were strong performers.
Over the course of the following 22 to 36 months, those planners gradually develop expertise of the planning process, knowledge of the target country, and learn the nuances of how to best plan with respect to the focus country. Unfortunately, the individual will move to another job just as their skills and knowledge are reaching functional maturity. The focus herein is not to fix this personnel shortfall. However, given this truth, it serves to emphasize the criticality of planning directorates developing a process whereby new planners rapidly gain practical regional knowledge and then foment an environment that sustains that expertise.
The second step is to utilize those capable planners' skills to develop a more perceptively crafted work plan. From the large list of potential engagements proposed each year, planners can pare the list down to those that subject matter experts expect Moscow will be interested in pursuing, then advocate for those that align with US values and objectives. Aside from the desired end-state of an effective M2M program, there are two near-term costs as part of this approach. First, initial years' work plans will lack depth until the mechanisms recommended here have time to establish an Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) cycle to feed the following years' plans. Second, this approach will curtail growth and result in a significantly smaller work plan than in recent years.
The current work plan process overemphasizes event completion, placing an equal measure of success, for example, on exchanging cadets between national service academies as it does a major bi-lateral naval exercise. This leads to the third step in adding value to the work plan: moving from tracking quantity towards tracking quality. The baseline for recording quality already exists in the expanded record-keeping instituted with the 2011 EUCOM work plan. With the addition of a qualitative post-event grading requirement via survey, critique, after-action report and other mechanisms, EUCOM can track engagement outcomes and migrate to the use of quality as the main measure of engagement value.
Assuredly, there are still challenges to instituting this process. What cadet is going to say his/her trip to Moscow was not amazing or how can the staff ensure that the Executive Officer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides an assessment of a senior leader engagement?
However, none of those challenges inhibit documenting the actual quality of an exchange, and for a relatively small amount of labor, at least some mechanism begins to emerge with which to scope the work plan in light of factual accomplishments. A secondary benefit of this approach is that it will create a statistical data set that follow-on researchers can utilize to address the more challenging issue of which specific engagement types/venues have historically yielded the greatest payoffs and thereby aid in formulating future work plans.
As is especially evident in pre-2011 EUCOM work plan documents, execution rates are the hallmark statistic of advertising the work plan's health. This research has discovered no indication that simply adding more engagement activities translates into better outcomes, and this approach may well be deleterious to overall objectives by focusing on quantity over quality.
Staffs may be partly to blame for this bureaucratic behavior as they seek opportunities to show value in their activities by advocating for programmatic growth. This leads to the fourth recommended step: advertise quality, not quantity. ECJ5 should eschew the use of the number of engagements or percentage executed as a measure of merit, and in their place substitute outcomes.
Thus rather than simply identifying that a cadet exchange aligns with the MOU criteria of "exchange visits and meetings of leaders at various levels" (or a similar line of activity) planners should outline specific expectations associated with the exchange and after-action reporting should capture how the event succeeded in meeting those goals. Notional outcomes might include Russia agreeing to host a reciprocal visit during the same calendar year, requiring the cadets to collaborate on and publish a research project, or require that the cadet exchange be joined with a senior level Russian leader visit with whom the US has been trying to facilitate a meeting. The after-action process of determining the degree to which specific outlined objectives were achieved as well as organic execution requirements (did the Russians execute on timeline, contribute the resources promised, and designate appropriate ranked individuals to participate?) will allow planners to qualify the value of specific engagements. This data will aid in determining value both with respect to meeting objectives but also in understanding Russian trends in commitment to differing engagement types.
By identifying specific outcomes to EUCOM's myriad "consumers" (their own
Command, partner agencies, Russian counterparts, etc.) EUCOM can iterate the OODA loop as part of their planning cycle. Advertising outcomes will promote discussion, disagreements, and feedback that will help planners to better understand Russian values, US benefits, and disconnects between the two, thereby linking this four-step process tooth-to-tail. Initially, the cost of refocusing planning efforts and reducing the breadth of the work plan may be unsatisfying; however, over the course of a few work plan cycles it will lead to a healthier, more results-focused M2M program in subsequent years.
The intent of this research is to help European Command improve the efficacy of their military-to-military training program. However, the proposed remedy is applicable to any faces the dilemma of a bilaterally agreed upon framework directing greater cooperation with
Russia, yet notes year-to-year M2M statistics indicating that more engagements haven't equated to more success. This paper finds that disconnect is a function of two trends. First, no outcomebased system exists to guide planners in the selection of engagement venues. This paper therefore suggests that specific M2M activities entered into the work plan be selected not only on the benefit to the US, but also the expectation that they are beneficial to the Kremlin and therefore likely to be executed. The skill sets required to help planners make those types of perceptive engagement recommendations come from a robust understanding of Russian cultural values. Three insights concerning the Kremlin's political culture that may prove helpful in understanding their behavior are; the importance of prestige to Russia's ruling class, Moscow's tendency to marginalize commitment to agreements, and a love-hate relationship with Western cooperation. Collectively these three norms serve as a lens through which to view why Moscow does or does not participate in the full range of scheduled work plan events, and potentially predict which engagements the Kremlin will pursue. In order to build and sustain the skill sets required to plan effectively, planning directorates should actively create workplace mechanisms that build and perpetuate country-specific knowledge for their staffs.
The second trend disconnecting the M2M intent from the M2M success rate lies in that Commands rely on the number of events executed as the primary metric of success. EUCOM has historically advertised "percent executed" as the measure of M2M value, but has observed a declining trend in that metric, with additional doubts about the quality of those events that do come to fruition. EUCOM should migrate away from quantity, and replace quality as the measure of health of Russo-US military-to-military engagement. This move will necessitate work synergistically over time to pare down the work plan to those events which are truly beneficial to both Russia and the US as well as likely to be executed.
The efforts required by COCOM staffs to refocus their planners as country experts, and sustain those perishable skills, will not be easy in today's resource constrained environment.
However, the long-term benefits of a more narrowly executed, but outcome-based work plan should go far in maximizing limited resources across the spectrum of engagement and address COCOM concerns that simple expansion of the military-to-military program is not the path to success.
